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Abstract
This paper is concerned with interest rate setting by commercial banks and how the
transmission of monetary policy is re°ected in these rates. For this purpose we study
the case of the Colombian banking industry for the period 1996-2004. Using microdata,
the Certi¯cate of Deposit(CD) market and the credit market are studied for a balanced
panel of 21 and 16 banks, respectively. The paper motivates the discussion with a
theoretical model that explains how banks set their interest rates and how these are
a®ected by the policy rate. Overcoming some of the empirical di±culties presented in
other studies, this paper deals with them by performing panel unit root tests and panel
cointegration tests. The results suggest that the transmission of the policy rate to the
CD rate and the credit rate is on average high and quick. Additionally, rates react
strongly to in°ation shocks, specially credit rates. Finally, the evidence presented
shows the importance of banks' characteristics and in°ation as long-run drivers of
interest rates.
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11 Introduction
There is a general agreement that, at least in the short-run, the monetary authority may
use its instruments to accomplish its objectives. Most central banks conduct their monetary
policy by targeting a short-term interest rate1. Movements on this rate are then transmitted
in the same direction to all the other market rates forcing households and ¯rms to revise their
optimal consumption and investment decisions. Then, through several channels, monetary
policy may a®ect the real economy2.
The above mechanism hinges on the assumption that indeed, movements on the policy
rate are transmitted to other market rates immediately and in a complete fashion. How-
ever, international literature has pointed out that this pass-through is not immediate and is
incomplete in the short-run. This implies that the mechanism takes time and is therefore
worthwhile to examine. The latter also implies that monetary policy actions transmit with
a lag to the ¯nancial system and to the real economy. The study of how banks set interest
rates and how these are a®ected by policy rates therefore lies on the heart of the monetary
transmission mechanism. This paper deals with this issue studying the Colombian bank-
ing industry for the period 1996-2004. The paper therefore examines the ¯rst step of the
monetary transmission mechanism, i.e, how the monetary authority a®ects relative prices,
but does not study the consequences over consumption and investment of these changes in
prices.
Recently, concerns about the e®ectiveness of the Banco de la Rep¶ ublica policy instrument
have emerged due to the apparent rigidity of the Colombian benchmark rate, the DTF 3.
Figure 1 shows how, in the recent past, the DTF has remained still, in spite of changes in
the policy rate. Even though this rate is a deposit rate, its stickiness is important since
roughly 66 percent of the credit stock is arranged in a °oating scheme tied to the DTF. This
paper tries to evaluate the e®ectiveness of the policy instrument by examining if the stance
1Borio (1997) reviews the implementation of monetary policy in industrial countries and shows how these
economies have emphasized the role of market oriented policies such as interest rate targets.
2An excellent survey of these channels can be found on the Journal of Economic Perspectives (1995) ,
Vol. 9, No. 4
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Figure 1: The DTF and the Policy Rate (Nov 1998- Feb 2005). Banco de la Rep¶ ublica
of policy is transmitted to bank's interest rates.
Although several papers like Clavijo (2004) and G¶ omez, V¶ asquez and Zea (2005) have
examined di®erent aspects of the monetary transmission mechanism for the Colombian econ-
omy, only Julio (2001) has examined the pass-through of the policy rate to market rates.
However, this paper lacks microeconomic foundations, a common feature in international
literature, as well as a discussion of the policy implications of its ¯ndings. The present paper
contributes to the existing literature by providing microeconomic foundations, and by using
microeconomic data. The use of bank level data is interesting since heterogeneity, a charac-
teristic of Colombian banks, can be examined and also the use of these data is not common in
international literature. The paper also has novel features in the econometric methodology
such as panel unit root tests and panel cointegration tests. The use of these techniques allow
a much better estimation of time series relations between variables, a desirable characteristic
in light of the purpose of this paper.
Overall, the results show that the transmission of interest rates, from the policy rate,
3proxied by the interbank rate, to the average Certi¯cate of Deposit (CD) rate and to the
average credit rate is high and quick. Rates seem to react vigorously to in°ation shocks,
specially credit rates. The evidence presented shows the importance of banks' characteristics
and in°ation as long-run drivers of interest rates.
The paper unfolds as follows. The next section reviews the relevant literature. Section
three and four are the core sections of the paper. In the third section, a theoretical model
is developed while section four tackles the problem empirically. Finally, the last section
concludes with some policy implications.
2 Literature Review
Arbitrarily, this review classi¯es relevant literature in three basic groups. The ¯rst group
discusses interest rate rigidity, the second deals with interest rate setting and the third one
reviews the scarce Colombian literature on the subject. Rather than being comprehensive,
representative papers are presented.
As mentioned before, international literature has found that interest rates exhibit rigidity.
The ¯rst paper that examined this issue was Hannan and Berger (1991) in which rigidity
was examined for deposit rates in the American banking industry. Rigidity emerges from
menu costs in which banks weight the bene¯ts of changing rates against the costs. Their
empirical results show that smaller banks operating in more concentrated markets are less
likely to change interest rates. Furthermore, they ¯nd that rigidity is exacerbated when the
stimulus for a change is upward, suggesting asymmetric adjustment4.
Cottarelli and Kourelis (1994) were the ¯rst to provide a systematic measure of the degree
of lending rate stickiness across a set of developed and developing countries. In a ¯rst step,
they measure the speed of adjustment of bank lending rates to money market rates. In a
second step, they regress this speed against several variables related to the structure of the
¯nancial system. In such a way, the paper ¯rst evaluates the stickiness and then tries to link it
4Evidence about asymmetry is not concluding between countries. While papers like Mojon (2000) ¯nd
positive evidence for the Euro others as Espinosa-Vega and Rebucci (2003), for Chile, have failed to accept
it .
4to the countries' ¯nancial structure. On average, the paper ¯nds that the degree of stickiness
is high. While in the long-run full adjustment takes place, in the short-run, adjustment is only
one third of the long-run multiplier. The degree of stickiness, particularly in the short-run, is
very di®erent across countries, suggesting that short-run di®erences may be a consequence of
adjustment costs, rather than long-run di®erences in loan demand elasticities. Relating the
stickiness to the ¯nancial structure, the authors ¯nd several conditions that increase lending
rate °exibility: i) the existence of a market for negotiable short-term instruments; ii) relative
volatility of money market rates; iii) the absence of barriers to entry in the banking industry;
iv) absence of constraints on international capital movements and v) private ownership of
the banking system. This paper as well as other in a similar spirit such as Mojon (2000)and
Espinosa-Vega and Rebucci (2003), lack microeconomic foundations. However, they provide
useful insights since they document stickiness and provide clues about why it happens.
The second group of studies builds its empirical estimations on the microeconomic foun-
dations of price setting by banks. Gambacorta (2004) studies the cross-sectional di®erences
in interest rates for a panel of Italian banks. The study is motivated by a model in which
a risk neutral bank operates under monopolistic competition. Under the assumption that
bank's interest rates and the money market rate are cointegrated, ¯rst order conditions
are expressed as an error correction model and are estimated using the Arellano and Bond
(1991) methodology. Basically, four conclusions emerge from the empirical analysis. In the
¯rst place, there is heterogeneity in the pass-through from money market rates to both de-
posit and loan rates only in the short-run. In the second place, short-term interest rate loans
for illiquid and undercapitalized banks react less to shocks from the monetary authority. In
the third place, banks with a high proportion of long-term lending change their prices less.
Finally, Gambacorta (2004) ¯nds that bank size is unimportant.
In this group, Berstein and Fuentes (2003a) study the lending rate's °exibility to changes
in the policy instrument for the Chilean banking industry. Their work is an attempt to
identify bank characteristics that can explain di®erences in average lending rates and the
way they react to changes in the policy rate. In a ¯rst step, their work replicates exercises
5as the ones documented in the ¯rst set of papers ¯nding rigidities only in the short-run.
The second part of their work is based on micro data. An asymmetric information model
in which banks operate under monopolistic competition is derived as a theoretical base for
their empirical estimations. Their dynamic panel data model ¯nds evidence of important
di®erences in the response of banks prices to the policy rate. The smaller the banks, the
larger the share of household consumers and the lower the portion of past due loans the
smaller the rigidity of interest rates to changes in the monetary authority instrument.
Both of these works provide very useful and interesting insights and overcome the atheo-
retical treatment of previous papers. However, they lack an adequate econometric treatment.
The authors do not deal explicitly with the time series properties of the variables. They as-
sume stationarity or non-stationarity of the variables without performing formal tests. In
the case of Berstein and Fuentes (2003a), they estimate the model in levels. In the case of
Gambacorta (2004), he assumes interest rates are non-stationary and therefore estimates an
error correction model assuming bank characteristics are I(0). The strategy implies only one
cointegration relation neglecting all other possible stationary combinations.
The third group comprises papers by Julio (2001) and Barajas, Steiner and Salazar
(1999). Julio (2001) studies the relationship between the central bank policy rate and the
interbank rate, the deposit rate and lending rates for ordinary and preferential customers
comparing the exchange rate band period and the free °oating period. The study covers
the period 1988-2001. Using a vector error correction model, he ¯nds evidence of a long-
run relation in which none of the variables is excluded and in which interest rate volatility
is less after the central bank adopted the free °oating scheme. With the exception of the
lending rates, during the free °oating period, the variance of the rates is explained in greater
proportion by changes in the policy rate. The ¯nding by Julio (2001) therefore provides
evidence in favor of the e®ectiveness of the policy instrument. The paper lacks microeconomic
foundations as well as a discussion about the policy implications of the ¯ndings.
Despite the absence of Colombian literature on interest rate setting, the work by Barajas,
Steiner and Salazar (1999) provides a useful insight in the sense that it studies interest
6rate margins for the banking industry. Using both aggregate and microeconomic data the
paper tries to explain the determinants of the interest rate margin for the pre-liberalization
(1974-1988) and post-liberalization periods (1991-1996). Prior to the liberalization period,
margins were driven to a great extent by competition while during the post-liberalization
period loan quality became the most important determinant. The panel data analysis for
the liberalization period suggests that operational costs are relatively more important than
loan quality as determinants of the interest rate margin.
Overall, four main conclusions emerge from this review: i) pass-through is incomplete
in the short-run and is therefore worthwhile to study; ii) banks' speci¯c characteristics
matter and for the Colombian case loan quality and operational costs seem particularly
relevant as determinants of interest rates; iii) a long-run relationship between policy rates
and market rates has existed in Colombia, at least in the period 1988-2001; iv) works focusing
on microeconomic data have failed to deal properly with the econometric traits of the series.
3 How do banks set interest rates?
A theoretical model
In this section a model in the Monti-Klein spirit 5 is developed in order to understand how
banks set interest rates and how these are related to the policy rate. Banking activities
consist of the production of loans, deposits and CDs. The analysis is based on a partial
equilibrium in the sense that demand for deposits, CDs and credit are given to the bank,
and with these, the bank maximizes pro¯ts 6.
The setup is as follows: we describe the demands the bank faces, followed by the costs it
5This model assumes a monopolist bank. Certainly, assuming this environment is not a reasonable descrip-
tion of the Colombian banking industry. Probably the best assumption is one of monopolistic competition.
However, this model can be generalized to the monopolistic competition case by assuming the existence of N
banks and adding product di®erentiation. Since the main issue of the paper is the setting of interest rates,
adding these features to the model does not add in this sense.
6Deriving them (i.e general equilibrium) should not add any insight to the main issue of this paper. What
could be interesting in a general equilibrium framework, but beyond the scope of the paper, could be how
interest rates a®ect demands for loans and deposits.
7assumes, the pro¯t maximization problem and ¯nally ¯rst order conditions are presented.
The bank faces demand for credit, deposits and certi¯cates of deposits (CDs)7. Demand
for credit is a negative function of the loan rate il, as with any normal good, and a positive
function of income y and prices p. As prices increases, more credit is needed, everything
else constant, as a result of lower purchasing power. Positive shocks to income, the scale
variable, increase the demand for credit, as in a money demand equation.
L
d = c0il + c1y + c2p (3.1)
c0 < 0; c1 > 0; c2 > 0;
Demand for deposits and CDs are similar and depend positively on the yield of the asset, id
and iCD respectively, income and prices8. Formally, the demand for deposits and CDs take
this form:
D
d = d0id + d1y + d2p (3.2)
d0 > 0; d1 > 0; d2 > 0;
CD
d = n0iCD + n1y + n2p (3.3)
n0 > 0; n1 > 0; n2 > 0;
The bank's balance sheet can be represented as follows:
7The speci¯cation for these demands follow Gambacorta (2004). Demand for CDs was added.
8The cost of other funding activities as well as the return on other assets can be included in the speci¯-
cation.
8L + R = D + CD + K (3.4)
where L stands for loans, R for reserve, D for deposits, CD for certi¯cates of deposits and
K is capital, which is exogenous and above requirements. When the reserve R is positive
it yields an exogenous rate i. However, after loans are handed, banks face a liquidity risk.
This risk can be materialized if withdrawals X are larger than R. This liquidity problem can
be solved by going to the interbank market9 and borrowing funds at the rate im that each
bank faces10. Following the reserve management modelling literature, and more speci¯cally
Freixas and Rochet (1997), each bank makes an estimate of the expected value of funds
it has to obtain in the interbank market. Assuming X is a gaussian random variable, the
liquidity shortage can be written as follows:
C
IL(X;R) = E [Max(0;X ¡ R)] =
Z 1
R
(x ¡ R)f(x)d(x) (3.5)
We assume the interbank rate that each bank faces is a function of the policy rate set
by the monetary authority and the bank's particular characteristics. For example, it is
reasonable to assume that a poorly capitalized small institution is charged a higher rate
than a healthier big institution. im can be written as:
im = a0iCB + ¡ ! a ¡ ! x (3.6)
where iCB is the policy rate, ¡ ! x is a vector of bank speci¯c variables and a0 > 0.
The bank faces the cost CL from producing loans and the cost CD from producing
deposits and CDs. These costs can be interpreted as screening and monitoring costs as well
as branching costs. Costs increase with the size of the operations as well as with wages.
9Since there is just one bank, this market cannot be labelled an interbank market. However we can think
of it as a money market where di®erent non-bank ¯nancial institutions meet.
10One can argue two reasons why the illiquid bank has to go this market instead of going directly to the
Central Bank window. The ¯rst is that the commercial bank can only borrow a limited amount of funds at
an attractive rate at the Central Bank. Hence, the remaining, has to be raised in the interbank market. The






















The bank maximizes pro¯ts choosing optimal interest rates, taking into account that a
percentage j of the loans are not repaid.




Substituting the balance sheet identity, i.e equation (3.4), the problem can be rewritten as
follows:





First order conditions can be derived from this equation for il,id and iCD
11. For practical
purposes we are are only interested in ¯rst order conditions for il and iCD. Equations (3.12)
and (3.13) show the ¯rst order conditions for both rates. As expected, both rates move in
the same direction than the policy rate. Equation (3.6) implies that a higher policy rate
increases the liquidity cost. In the case of the CDs market, the increase in this cost forces the






f(x)d(x) = ¡[1 ¡ ©(R)] (3.11)
where © is the c.d.f of the distribution.
10bank to o®er a higher rate iCD so he can attract more CDs, a stable source of funding not
subject to withdrawals, and in this way reduce the cost. For the credit market, the higher
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On the one hand, the optimal iCD depends positively on the policy rate and negatively
on income, prices and wages (equation 3.12 ). Higher income and prices increase the supply
of funds consumers take to the bank, and therefore a lower interest rate is need to clear the
market. Higher wages imply lower yields iCD to consumers.
On the other hand, the optimal loan rate depends positively on income, prices, wages,
and the policy rate ( equation 3.13). Higher income and prices increase the demand for
credit forcing the interest rate to go up in order to clear the market. Loan rates move on
the same direction than wages and loan quality as costs are transferred to consumers.
4 Empirical Evidence
4.1 The data
The data set used, is comprised by two subsets: one for the CDs market and another for
the credit market. For the CDs market, information about interest rates is available from
11January 1996 with monthly periodicity for instruments maturing in 30, 45, 60, 90, 120,
180 and 360 days. Weighting by the amount of CDs maturing in each horizon, iCD was
constructed. In the case of the credit market, information begins on May 1997 and includes
information on consumer credit and commercial ordinary, preferential and treasury credit.
Mortgage credit was excluded since by Sentence 955 of 2000, the Colombian Constitutional
Court established interest rate ceilings for these operations. il was constructed by weighting
the amount of loans in each type of credit operation. For both cases, interest rates are
marginal, i.e., they are a monthly average of the interest rates charged on operations during
that month and are not based on the stock of credit or deposits. Both data sets end on
September 2004. The use of these data is rather novel since it has been rarely used. Only
Estrada (2005) has used this information for the CDs market.
This information was complemented by balance sheet data supplied by the Superin-
tendencia Bancaria. Additionally, information for the capital adequacy ratio (CAR) and
number of employees was included12. The panels were balanced 13 and resulted in 21 ¯nan-
cial institutions for the CDs market and 16 institutions for the credit market14. Trying to
implement the model presented previously, the following indicators, in addition to the CAR,
were constructed: non-performing loans to total loans (j), average monthly wages (w) for the
banking industry, the share of bank i assets to total assets as a proxy for size and the ratio
total loans to deposits. The latter proxies for liquidity risk since a bank that lends a higher
proportion of its deposits is prone to face liquidity problems. The capital adequacy ratio
and the size proxy are included as variables that may a®ect the cost of interbank funding
12The monthly number of employees was estimated with yearly observations as in Estrada and Osorio
(2004) regressing the number of employees against ¯xed assets and a time trend. Speci¯cation tests, suggested
the following ¯xed e®ects model:
ln(employees) = 4:893 + 0:141 ¤ ln(¯xed assets)-0.0525*t
(1:086) (0:06) (0:008)
with R2 = 0:676. Standard Error in parenthesis.
13Balancing the panel could result in an bias even though banks selected are representative. What this
implies is that results should be interpreted as exclusive for these banks. However, balancing the panel has
important bene¯ts in terms of an adequate econometric treatment.
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Figure 2: The Interbank Rate and the Policy Rate (Jan 1997- Sept 2004). Banco de la
Rep¶ ublica
(¡ ! x ).
Microeconomic data were complemented with the seasonally adjusted industrial produc-
tion index and the twelve month variation of the consumer price index. As for the policy rate
variable, the interbank rate was chosen. The main reason for not using the policy rate is the
step function behavior it exhibits since changes are not frequent. This creates econometric
problems since little variation is not a desirable characteristic when thinking in parametric
approaches. However, as can be seen from Figure 2, the interbank rate follows very closely
the Central Bank policy rate15 .
4.2 Empirical strategy
As a ¯rst step, unit root tests were conducted to all variables. Traditional augmented Dickey
Fuller tests were performed on the industrial production index, the in°ation rate and the
15Indeed, this is a common assumption for the Colombian case. See for example Bernal (2002).
13interbank rate since these series are common for all individuals in the panel 16. In all cases
variables were non-stationary. Unlike previous work by Berstein and Fuentes (2003a) and
Gambacorta (2004) in which they assume bank interest rates are either stationary or non-
stationary and where they assume bank characteristics are stationary, this paper deals with
this issue performing panel unit root test. The Im, Pesaran and Shin(1997) (IPS) test and
Maddala and Wu(1999) Fisher test were used. Both tests are discussed in the appendix 17.
The use of panel unit root tests helps us deal with the structure of the data as well as to
overcome the low power of traditional tests 18. As can be seen from Table 1, all variables
follow unit root processes.
Table No. 1: Panel Unit Root Tests*
IPS Fisher
CD rate c 0.658 0.99
c y t 0.472 1.00
Credit rate c 0.586 0.99
c y t 0.511 0.99
Size c 0.3434 0.2896
c y t 0.8385 0.5015
CAR c 0.4555 0.2718
c y t 0.6349 0.6811
Non-performing c 0.2617 0.2468
loans c y t 0.7107 0.4523
Wages c 0.826 0.5077
c y t 0.7964 0.4853
loans/deposits c 0.7383 0.4715
c y t 0.9334 0.5363
*p-values reported. Ho= unit root. 3 lags
16Results for these tests are not presented but are available upon request.
17Is worth pointing out two points: i) for both tests the null hypothesis is the existence of a unit root, and
ii) the empirical evaluation of these tests by Maddala and Wu(1999) favor the use of the Fisher test.
18See Chapter 4 of Maddala and Kim (1998) on this issue.
14Given that all variables are I(1), it is natural to think in a cointegration framework. The
fact that we have an important number of variables leads us to think of cointegration in the
spirit of Johansen (1988) and Johansen and Joselius (1990). Since the dataset has a panel
structure, a panel VEC estimation seems logical. Following Larsson, Lyhagen and Lothgren
(2001), let us consider a panel data set that has N cross-sections (banks) and T time periods.
The error correction model for the V AR(ki) can be written as follows:
4Yit = ¦iYi;t¡1 +
ki¡1 X
k=1
¡ik4Yi;t¡k + "it (4.1)
Larsson, Lyhagen and Lothgren (2001) propose a likelihood-based cointegration rank test
that allows us to test the existence of cointegration which implies a model as (4.1). If that
is the case, then ¦i is of reduced rank, and it is possible to let ¦i = ®i £ ¯i. This allows us
to estimate the long-run relationship between the variables. The test proposed is similar in
spirit to the IPS test and is based on conventional trace tests. The test is discussed in the
appendix. The test statistics, Zt trace, are presented in Tables 2a and 2b for the CDs market
and the credit market respectively. This test statistic should be compared to a N(0;1). As
can be seen from the tables, a common cointegration rank does exist. For the CDs market,
the panel test suggests that there are at least 4 cointegration relations while for the credit
market there are at least 8 cointegration relations19.
19For the CDs market, the following variables were used: CD rate, industrial production index, in°ation
rate, interbank rate, CAR, wages, loans to deposits and the size proxy. For the credit market the same
variables were used with the exception of the CD rate which was replaced by the credit rate and the ratio
of non-performing loans to total loans which was included.
15Table 2a: Larsson et. al (2001) Cointegration Test: CDs market










Table 2b: Larsson et. al (2001) Panel Cointegration Test: Credit market











Having established the existence of cointegration relationships between the variables, estima-
tion issues have to be addressed. The panel VEC estimation was done estimating equation
(4.1) for each of the banks for each market using the Johansen (1988) procedure. The major
limitation of this strategy is that inference is limited because a covariance matrix between
individuals cannot be estimated 20. This limits the analysis since interesting hypothesis,
such as ¯i = ¯, cannot be tested. However, the strategy followed allows for the estimation
20The only available joint likelihood estimator for equation (4.1) is proposed by Groen and Kleibergen
(2002). Unfortunately, this estimation procedure could not be implemented since computationally it is very
demanding.
16of each ¦i,21which is a much better assumption than ¦i = ¦ as in the Engle and Granger
panel VEC literature.
Although results varied bank by bank, weak exogeneity tests and exclusion tests suggested
the variables used were appropriate. It is interesting to note that variables such as loan risk,
CAR and size were also important in the work by Berstein and Fuentes (2003b). The signs,
given by the theoretical model, and sizes of the coe±cients associated with the long-run
vector determined which cointegration vector was used. For one bank in the credit market
no plausible vectors were found. This bank was excluded from the analysis.
4.3 Results
As a result of our estimation, we obtained the long-run coe±cients (¯) for the interbank
rate, the policy rate proxy, for both markets. A coe±cient near one means that interest
rates set by banks move in line with the policy rate, i.e., the instrument works in the
long-run. Arbitrarily, Table 3 classi¯es banks according to the degree of transmission. A
bank was classi¯ed as a low transmission bank if the coe±cient was below 0.5, a medium
transmission bank if the coe±cient was somewhere between 0.5 an 0.75 and was classi¯ed
as a high transmission bank if the coe±cient was above that range. For the CDs market, 11
out of 21 banks were classi¯ed as high transmission banks, 8 were classi¯ed as medium and
only 2 as low. The average coe±cient for all the sample was 0.75. For the credit market, the
average coe±cient was 0.76. 7 banks classi¯ed as high transmission, 7 as medium and 1 as
low. The di®erence between this ¯s widens when we consider only the banks that appear in
both data sets. For these common banks, the average coe±cient is 0.73 for the CDs market
and 0.79 for the credit market.



















17Table 3: Distribution of banks according to their degree of transmission




Total banks 21 15
Average ¯ 0.75 0.76
Lutkepohl(1993) emphasizes the fact that properly speaking, long-run coe±cients cannot
be interpreted as elasticities since this would imply ignoring the endogenous nature of the
variables. However, they do show us the long-run relationship between the variables. This
endogeneity issue was tackled using impulse response functions that are presented in Figures
3 to 8. Impulse response functions are plotted for the corresponding interest rate, CD rate
or credit rate, the in°ation rate and the industrial production index. For the policy rate
shock and the in°ation rate the shock amounted to 100 basis points increase. In the case of
the industrial production index, a one standard deviation positive shock was applied.
For the CDs market, it is possible to see that all banks react to the policy shock by
increasing interest rates although the intensity is di®erent among banks. It is worth noticing
that only one of the banks seems to overreact to the policy rate shock, de¯ning overreaction
as a response in a much higher proportion than the shock. It is possible to measure, approx-
imately, how many months a bank takes to respond with the maximum interest rate. On
average, after 6.1 months the maximum response is observed. As for the credit market, all
banks react to the shock and in a di®erent way. However, it is possible to classify 5 out of
15 banks as over-shooters. These banks increase their credit rate in much more than the 100
basis point shock in the policy rate. On average, after 4.4 months the maximum response is
observed suggesting that credit rates react faster than deposit rates to interbank movements.
Additionally, one can compare the maximum response of banks that are in both data sets.
For the majority of the banks, the maximum response is higher in the credit market than in
the CDs market. Big banks react strongly in the CDs market when compared to the rest,
18while in the credit market, reaction of these seems to be milder.
As expected both rates react to in°ation shocks. What is very interesting is that interest
rates overreact to unexpected in°ation shocks. Rates are increased in a much higher pro-
portion than changes in the in°ation rate. While for the CDs market, 14 out of 21 banks
turned out to be over-shooters with respect to the in°ation rate, in the credit market all of
the banks but one can be classi¯ed as over-shooters in this sense. Comparing the maximum
response of common banks, the reaction is stronger in the credit market.
As for the income shock, the response of the CDs rate and the credit rate is di®erent. On
the CDs market, for the majority of the banks, interest rates take some time to react but
they do so in a positive humped shaped fashion. For the credit market, the most common
reaction is a quick and positive one followed by a downward response.
These facts suggest that deposit rates are stickier than credit rates. This behavior lacks
a straight forward explanation if we keep in mind that the period of study is characterized
by interest rates going down 22 and that impulse response analysis is symmetrical. The last
implies that an explanation to this ¯nding has to work adequately to upward and downward
stimuli. For example, explaining this result as the consequence of an oligopolic behavior could
fail to work since if this was the case, it would be strange for banks to lower their lending
rate faster and stronger than its deposit rate when faced with a downward stimulus23.
Variance decomposition exercises, presented on Tables 3 and 4, turned out to be extremely
suggestive. In a 24 month horizon it was possible to observe the following behavior for 11
out of 15 banks included in the credit market. In the ¯rst periods, an important part of
the credit rate variance was explained by the rate itself and by the interbank rate. In°ation
and variables re°ecting the cost of ¯nancial intermediation, such as loan quality or wages,
explained a minor share of the interest rate variance. On the last periods, the percentage
22Out of the 104 monthly observation, 67 periods presented a downward move in the interbank rate.
23One can think of other reasons as for example the balance sheet structure of Colombian banks, where
one third of the assets are denominated in ¯xed rates while on the liability side most instruments are on a
variable basis. Taking this into account, it would be reasonable to think that when faced with a positive
in°ation shock, banks have to increase more than proportionally the rates charged in order to compensate
for the stock of loans that is set at a ¯xed rate. However when thinking of negative in°ation shocks this
might not make sense because it would not be reasonable to say that banks would forgo the pro¯ts already
made by lowering interest rates down.
19explained by the same rate and the interbank rate dropped importantly. However, the
fraction explained by the in°ation rate and the proxies for ¯nancial intermediation costs
increased dramatically. What the latter suggests is that in the short-run credit rates are
driven by the interbank rate and the rate itself. In the long-run, the credit rate depends
upon ¯nancial intermediation costs and in°ation. For the remaining 4 banks what could
be observed was that the importance of the interbank rate increased as well as ¯nancial
intermediation costs and in°ation. For these banks, the same rate explained a very important
percentage of the variance of the rate. For the CDs market, 12 out of 21 banks followed
the behavior described above. In the short-run, variance of the CD rate was driven by
the same rate and by the interbank rate, while in°ation and ¯nancial intermediation costs
are the main determinants in the long-run. For 6 banks, the importance of intermediation
costs increased with time but in°ation did not play an important role. For the remaining
three banks, the percentage explained by intermediation costs increased with time but the
importance of in°ation decreased, which is strange when thinking of nominal interest rates.
Rounding up, the exercises presented highlighted the following facts: i) transmission
seems to be high and quick; ii) all banks react in the same direction than the change in
stance of policy but some react more than others; iii)the maximum interest rate response is
faster in the credit market than in the deposit market when faced with a policy stimulus;
iv)interest rates overreact to in°ation shocks specially in the credit market; v) variance of
interest rates is determined in the short-run mainly by the same rate and the interbank rate
while in the long run, in°ation and ¯nancial intermediation costs seem to be the driving
factors.
5 Conclusions and policy implications
The present paper studied the Colombian monetary transmission mechanism, for the period
1996 to 2004, trying to examine how banks' interest rates are a®ected by the monetary
authority. This is a relevant issue since central banks conduct their monetary policy by
targeting a short-term interest rate that a®ects all other market rates. In addition, the
20rigidity exhibited lately by the Colombian benchmark interest rate, the DTF, has raised
questions about the e®ectiveness of the policy instrument. The paper tackled the pass-
through issue empirically by using microeconomic data for the credit market and the CDs
market. Overall the results show that pass-through to both credit rates and CDs rates is high
and quick, that rates react strongly to in°ation shocks and that the policy rate seems to drive
interest rates in the short-run while in the long-run, in°ation and ¯nancial intermediation
costs are the main drivers. The response of credit rates to a policy shock is quicker than for
the CDs rate and is stronger when faced by an in°ation shock.
These results have at least four important policy implications. In ¯rst place, the policy
instrument is e®ective in a ¯rst step, since it moves both the CDs rate and credit rates.
However, these results do not provide evidence of the e®ectiveness of the monetary trans-
mission mechanism as a whole, since the paper does not evaluates the e®ect of monetary
actions on consumption and investment decisions. In second place, the fact that interest
rates react more to in°ation shocks than to policy shocks is an argument in favor of mone-
tary intervention. If high interest rates are seen as pervasive, society is better o® with central
bank intervention (assuming the intervention is e®ective in taming in°ation) than without
it, since in the ¯rst scenario interest rates increase less than in the second. In third place, as
shown empirically, in the long-run, interest rates re°ect in°ation and intermediation costs.
Politicians worried with the inconvenience of high interest rates should pursue real policies
to reduce ¯nancial intermediation costs such as eliminating the ¯nancial transaction tax and
mandatory low yield government investments as well as improving the legal framework for
reducing the time and costs of recuperating delinquent loans. Finally, policy makers inter-
ested in improving the e®ectiveness of the monetary authority should keep in mind that the
literature studying interest rate rigidity has identi¯ed market concentration as a main source
of low pass-through.24 Reforms aimed at increasing banking competition should make the
instrument more e®ective.
In spite of the positive evidence presented here, further research should asses the ef-
24Evidence in this regards is presented in Hannan and Berger (1991) for the American industry and
Berstein and Fuentes (2003b) for the Chilean industry.
21fectiveness of the monetary mechanism as a whole and should study the consequences of
interest rate rigidity in terms of optimal monetary policy. A novel paper in this last area
is Kobayashi (2005). As the results suggest banks' asymmetric response could be an issue
worthwhile to study as well.
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Econometric appendix
Panel unit root tests
In this paper, two di®erent panel unit root test are performed, namely, Im, Pesaran and
Shin(1997) (IPS) test and Maddala and Wu (1999) Fisher test. In what follows, both tests
are brie°y discussed following quite closely Maddala and Wu(1999).
The basic idea of the parametric IPS test is to test the following model:
4yi;t = ½iyi;t¡1 + ®i + "i;t
24where under the null, ½i = 0 and ®i for all i. In this way, IPS overcome the major limitation
of earlier work by Levin and Lin(1992) in which ½i = ½. IPS perform individual unit root
test for the N cross-section units instead of pooling the data. Letting ti;T(i = 1;2;:::;N)






where tN;T = 1
N
PN
i=1 ti;T. ¹ and ¾ are computed using Monte Carlo methods. In essence,
IPS tests the joint signi¯cance of N independent unit root tests.
The non-parametric Fisher test, proposed by Maddala and Wu (1999), is based on the
sum of log-p-values derived from individual unit root test. If test statistics are continuous, the
signi¯cance levels ¼i(i = 1;2;:::;N) are independent uniform (0,1) variables, and ¡2loge¼i
has Â2 distribution with two degrees of freedom. Using the additive property of Â2 variables,
¸ = ¡2
PN
i=1 loge¼i has a Â2 distribution with 2N degrees of freedom. With this statistic,
the null of a unit root can be tested.
Based on Monte Carlo experiments Maddala and Wu(1999) favor the use of the Fisher
test. Smaller size distortion and higher power, even in the presence of stationary and non-
stationary series, support this test.
Panel cointegration test
Larsson, Lyhagen and Lothgren (2001) propose a panel test for the existence of a com-
mon cointegration rank based on likelihood inference for vector autoregressive models as in
the spirit of Johansen. They propose an LR-bar test statistic similar to the test statistics
proposed by Im, Pesaran and Shin(1997).
Formally, the following rank hypothesis is tested for all i = 1;:::;N:
H0 : rank(¦i) = ri · r
H1 : rank(¦i) = p
25That is, were are testing the hypothesis that all of the N banks in the panel have at most r
cointegrating relationships among p variables.
Denoting the trace statistic for group i as LRiTfH(r) j H(p)g, the LB-bar statistic is
de¯ned as the average of the N individual trace statistics:






The standarized LB-bar statistic for a common panel cointegration test they propose
takes the following form:
¨LR =
p
NLRNTfH(r) j H(p)g ¡ E(Zk)
p
V ar(Zk)
The moments of Zk can be obtained from Table 1 of the Larsson, Lyhagen and Lothgren
(2001) paper. The authors also prove that, under certain assumptions, ¨LR =) N(0;1) as
N and T ¡! 1.
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32Table 3: Variance Decomposition exercise for CD rate (21 banks)
Period S.E. CD rate interbank p IP size CAR loans/deposits w
1 1.0 37.7 49.3 1.9 0.2 7.4 2.9 0.2 0.4
12 5.5 7.9 62.0 3.7 9.1 1.3 5.6 10.1 0.2
24 7.4 6.6 56.2 6.6 6.1 2.5 12.3 9.2 0.4
1 0.9 83.5 6.5 2.2 1.2 1.3 0.2 5.0 0.0
12 3.9 10.9 13.0 10.3 29.2 1.4 6.8 27.3 1.0
24 8.6 7.4 7.7 5.7 26.4 3.2 3.9 37.9 7.8
1 1.0 33.0 58.3 0.3 0.3 7.7 0.2 0.2 0.0
12 6.4 29.6 38.6 12.9 9.4 3.8 0.7 1.0 4.0
24 9.5 25.5 21.3 20.3 15.8 9.5 0.6 3.1 4.0
1 1.2 31.3 55.9 0.4 2.9 0.0 0.3 7.1 2.2
12 4.9 9.6 19.7 23.0 0.6 16.2 2.1 22.8 6.0
24 6.8 7.1 11.7 25.6 1.4 25.2 3.1 19.2 6.6
1 0.5 41.6 24.1 6.5 7.1 3.3 0.6 0.0 16.7
12 4.6 7.5 28.6 2.6 49.1 4.6 2.8 2.2 2.4
24 8.1 5.1 14.2 2.5 43.7 21.9 8.0 1.9 2.7
1 1.24 56.65 42.07 0.07 0.00 0.02 0.15 0.99 0.04
12 4.5 21.1 35.2 7.0 9.1 1.1 18.1 4.3 4.2
24 5.9 14.0 23.9 17.5 10.4 7.9 16.5 4.9 4.9
1 0.8 40.0 55.5 0.0 2.0 1.5 0.3 0.0 0.7
12 4.8 14.9 25.3 5.6 36.9 1.0 6.9 3.3 6.0
24 7.8 14.7 9.6 10.9 30.0 2.6 6.6 6.2 19.3
1 0.5 66.2 10.9 2.9 2.9 1.1 4.4 0.9 10.7
12 3.0 11.1 38.1 5.7 5.3 5.3 0.8 4.8 29.0
24 6.6 11.7 14.2 1.3 14.5 6.7 1.1 1.2 49.4
1 0.8 60.1 30.5 5.2 1.3 1.7 0.9 0.2 0.1
12 6.2 5.7 26.9 7.8 23.3 4.9 1.0 19.4 10.9
24 8.6 3.0 20.8 11.3 16.7 8.0 0.8 31.4 7.8
1 1.0 37.6 41.7 0.2 0.5 5.1 9.5 5.1 0.3
12 5.5 28.1 47.1 6.7 1.0 0.8 13.7 1.1 1.6
24 6.6 22.1 35.3 14.1 0.7 3.7 14.0 8.2 1.8
1 0.5 64.0 24.9 5.3 4.3 0.0 0.3 1.0 0.2
12 4.7 23.1 24.5 9.1 21.9 8.9 3.0 5.5 4.0
24 7.4 14.6 14.7 4.1 19.7 26.5 15.2 3.2 2.0
1 0.7 42.2 54.0 0.3 2.0 0.0 0.6 0.6 0.3
12 6.5 3.3 37.0 1.9 9.0 6.5 0.4 13.8 28.1
24 9.3 3.3 25.5 2.5 9.7 14.7 0.4 18.0 25.8
1 0.6 43.2 33.1 10.2 1.7 0.0 3.7 8.0 0.1
12 4.9 9.3 23.3 2.2 41.6 20.0 1.8 0.3 1.4
24 8.7 4.3 8.2 1.2 42.3 33.3 7.7 1.1 1.9
1 1.0 69.0 22.8 0.0 1.3 0.9 1.0 5.1 0.0
12 7.0 2.3 42.1 10.7 36.2 3.9 1.1 1.7 2.0
24 9.7 1.3 39.1 13.7 35.9 2.6 3.1 1.1 3.1
1 1.0 45.0 45.6 4.8 0.1 2.6 0.9 0.7 0.3
12 4.4 3.9 56.7 13.2 6.5 2.9 4.4 8.3 4.0
24 7.1 2.9 40.5 5.5 26.7 13.9 2.6 4.8 3.2
1 0.6 63.5 15.7 6.2 1.5 7.9 3.0 1.7 0.5
12 5.4 2.7 61.9 2.8 18.5 0.8 9.7 2.4 1.3
24 7.6 1.7 47.9 7.9 18.3 6.7 15.5 1.3 0.8
1 0.8 58.8 30.1 5.6 1.8 0.2 1.3 2.0 0.2
33Table 3: Variance Decomposition exercise for CD rate (21 banks)
Period S.E. CD rate interbank p IP size CAR loans/deposits w
12 6.7 9.5 30.8 8.2 28.3 3.9 0.2 11.1 7.9
24 9.9 7.9 27.5 12.3 26.8 6.3 0.7 11.7 6.8
1 1.2 18.0 76.8 1.0 0.2 2.8 0.1 1.0 0.0
12 4.3 8.8 38.9 15.2 1.9 7.3 3.2 14.6 10.1
24 6.9 4.7 20.7 9.8 2.4 5.7 4.3 8.5 43.9
1 0.9 65.5 14.5 12.7 0.1 3.3 0.0 0.6 3.3
12 5.3 7.3 49.9 13.5 5.6 1.4 2.4 6.0 13.9
24 7.3 4.1 30.3 21.8 5.7 10.0 3.5 12.4 12.2
1 1.3 27.2 62.8 3.5 0.9 2.6 0.0 0.3 2.8
12 4.9 3.2 42.7 7.6 8.9 3.9 2.1 10.6 21.0
24 7.2 2.0 36.7 9.1 16.4 8.0 7.3 7.0 13.5
1 1.5 29.2 61.2 6.5 2.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.5
12 6.8 14.0 23.4 2.6 21.6 6.1 20.5 11.0 0.6
24 9.7 10.4 13.4 5.2 22.4 3.1 14.4 26.1 4.9
34Table 4: Variance Decomposition exercise for Credit Rate (15 banks)
Period S.E. interbank credit rate size CAR IP p w j loans/deposits
1 3 55 34 0 0 0 0 0 1 10
12 5 48 12 1 1 2 8 10 6 12
24 6 40 11 1 1 10 10 12 5 11
1 3 55 34 0 0 0 0 0 1 10
12 5 48 12 1 1 2 8 10 6 12
24 6 40 11 1 1 10 10 12 5 11
1 3 5 80 2 0 2 0 1 10 1
12 5 41 28 6 6 5 3 5 4 2
24 6 36 24 6 7 13 3 5 4 2
1 2 81 17 0 1 0 0 1 0 1
12 4 43 14 13 3 3 15 3 1 5
24 5 35 12 12 6 3 15 11 2 5
1 2 56 40 0 0 0 0 0 1 2
12 5 27 19 4 4 1 18 16 7 4
24 6 21 15 14 4 12 13 12 4 5
1 3 87 11 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
12 5 34 10 2 4 3 27 2 10 9
24 6 32 10 2 5 4 27 1 9 11
1 2 87 11 0 0 0 0 0 2 0
12 5 46 17 2 12 1 11 1 4 6
24 6 40 14 10 8 1 10 2 3 12
1 2 55 38 0 1 0 2 0 1 3
12 5 31 24 2 6 2 18 3 7 7
24 6 32 13 5 6 3 12 3 18 10
1 3 23 68 6 1 1 0 0 0 0
12 5 45 19 4 0 11 4 14 3 0
24 6 42 15 3 3 16 4 12 3 2
1 3 24 76 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
12 5 28 42 1 1 3 18 2 5 1
24 6 25 38 2 1 6 19 2 4 2
1 3 85 12 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
12 6 38 27 1 1 0 20 2 9 2
24 6 32 23 1 1 7 22 2 9 2
1 3 30 62 2 0 3 2 0 1 0
12 5 60 5 2 1 13 11 2 1 5
24 6 52 4 3 1 16 11 3 2 8
1 2 54 39 0 2 2 0 1 0 3
12 4 35 24 2 4 3 11 9 9 2
24 6 30 13 3 6 5 22 10 6 3
1 3 3 70 0 0 1 1 7 13 4
12 6 29 9 1 8 7 15 12 18 2
24 6 27 10 3 7 6 18 11 18 2
1 2 53 42 0 0 0 2 0 1 1
12 5 26 18 15 9 2 24 2 2 1
24 6 17 9 26 6 11 18 2 7 3
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